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Competition and Coalition Formation of
Renewable Power Producers
Baosen Zhang, Ramesh Johari, Ram Rajagopal
Abstract—We investigate group formations and strategic be-
haviors of renewable power producers in electricity markets.
These producers currently bid into the day-ahead market in
a conservative fashion because of the real-time risk associated
with not meeting their bid amount. It has been suggested in the
literature that producers would bid less conservatively if they
can form large groups to take advantages of spatial diversity
to reduce the uncertainty in their aggregate output. We show
that large groups of renewable producers would act strategically
to lower the aggregate output because of market power. To
maximize renewable power production, we characterize the
trade-off between market power and generation uncertainty as a
function of the size of the groups. We show there is a sweet spot
in the sense that there exists groups that are large enough to
achieve the uncertainty reduction of the grand coalition, but are
small enough such that they have no significant market power. We
consider both independent and correlated forecast errors under
a fixed real-time penalty. We also consider a real-time market
where both selling and buying of energy are allowed. We validate
our claims using PJM and NREL data.
Index Terms—Renewable Integration, Electricity Markets,
Cournot Games, Coalitions and Competition
I. INTRODUCTION
Renewable resources such as wind and solar are expected
to play increasingly prominent roles in power systems. An
aspect of the bulk electricity system that is fundamental to
the success of integration of these renewable sources is the
electricity market. Since it is the main venue of resource
allocation in power systems [1], understanding the interaction
between market rules and the producers is crucial to maximize
the gain from renewables. Because the key difference between
renewable resources and traditional generators is that the for-
mer is much more uncertain than the latter, the main question
of interest is how does uncertainty impact the outcome and
function of the market.
Currently, most electricity markets in the United States and
Europe operate in a multistage manner [1], [2]. Twenty four
hours in advance of the actual operating time (often termed
real-time), a day-ahead market is used to match supply and de-
mand for an hour long slot. Then one or more additional stages
are used to adjust for variations in supply and demand that
may not have been settled in the day-ahead market. However,
the current market was not designed to accommodate large
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amounts of uncertainty in the supply. A guiding philosophy of
electricity market design is to ensure that supply and demand
are always balanced, so that generators are incentivized to
meet their day-ahead allocations. Generators that cannot meet
their obligations are subjected to a penalty on their shortfall, or
extremely volatile real-time prices, or a combination of both
[2].
Because deviations between real-time output and day-ahead
obligations are disincentivized, renewable producers tend to
bid conservatively in electricity markets to protect against real-
time risks. Since the day-ahead prediction error of a wind farm
can be up to 25% (somewhat less for solar), producers bid
much less than the forecasted amount of renewables [3], [4],
[5]. This behavior in turn limits the actual amount of power
generated from renewables, since the load not served by the
renewables is picked up by traditional generators [6].
In addition to improving the forecasting technology, one
promising method of reducing the uncertainty in renewable
resources is to take advantage of geographical diversity as
pointed out by many authors [4], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12].
For example, aggregating renewable producers at spatially
separate locations can reduce the variability of the total output.
In essence, the aggregate is easier to forecast than its individual
parts, thus an aggregate of producers could bid less conserva-
tively into the day-ahead market and consequently increase
the amount of power generated from renewable sources [13],
[14], [15], [16], [17]. Therefore it seems that system operators
should encourage renewable producers to form coalitions.
On the other hand, aggregating or grouping renewable
producers could potentially increase their market power and
lead to unintended outcomes. Because of several high profile
cases1, system operators vigilantly oppose generator collusion
of any kind. Indeed, if an aggregate of renewable producers
is large enough, it could become price-anticipatory since its
bid could have significant effects on the clearing prices of the
market. Fig 1 (reproduced from [19]) shows the day-ahead
prices drop dramatically even at 10% penetration of wind in
the PJM control area2. In order to maximize its profit (quantity
times price), an aggregate may not bid all of its forecasted
wind. Therefore an aggregate of renewable producers may
withhold some of the renewable not because of uncertainty,
but because of the market power. Thus from this point of
view, it seems that operators should not allow producers to
form groups.
1For example, see the California Electricity Crisis [18].
2PJM is a regional transmission organization covering parts of the eastern
United States.
2Fig. 1. Scatter plot of PJM day-ahead prices and wind generation for 2012.
Figure reproduced from [19]. The horizontal axis is the percentage penetration
of wind, and the vertical axis is the average clearing price in the PJM area.
As the amount of wind penetration increases from 0 to 10%, the average price
in the system drops by more than half.
In this paper, we show that the system operator can have its
cake and eat it too. More precisely, we investigate the trade-
off between uncertainty and market power for an aggregation
of renewable power producers. We show that for a wide range
of scenarios, there exists groups of certain sizes that both
induce the maximum amount of renewable penetration and
do not possess significant market power. Interestingly, the
grand coalition (group of all producers) is never desirable.
To arrive at this conclusion, we first build a parametrized
model of the residual demand curve to isolate the effect of
renewables on the day-ahead clearing price. Each group of
renewable producers is allowed to bid a number that represent
their production quantity into the market. The resulting product
of the clearing price and the bid quantity determines the
day-ahead profit of the groups of producers. For the real-
time risk, we consider two models: a fixed penalty on the
shortfall and a stochastic model for the real-time market. The
payoff for each group is defined as the sum of the day-
ahead profit plus the real-time risk, and we set up a Cournot
game based on the payoff functions. We establish the trade-off
between uncertainty and market power by analyzing the Nash
equilibrium of this game. Some of the more game-theoretic
questions are studied in our paper in [20].
In this paper (and [20]) the uncertainty in the renewable
production can be thought as follows. Each producer has
an estimate of its available power (e.g. from wind or solar
irradiation) in the form of a random variable. Note the ran-
domness comes from the error associated with the estimate.
For a group, the estimate is the sum of the estimates of its
members, which is again a random variable. First we consider
the case when the random variables are independent (that is,
the forecast error of the producers are independent). We scale
the system by letting the number of producers go to infinity,
and the size of each producer go to zero, so the total amount
of renewable generation in the system is fixed. By the law of
large numbers, as long as the number of producers in a group
grows, the uncertainty of the aggregate goes to zero (random
variable for that group concentrates around its mean). Also, it
is widely known that as the number of players grows, Cournot
games becomes competitive since no player has significant
market power [21]. Our result essentially states that as long
as the number of groups and the size of each group both
go to infinity, the market is competitive (competition between
groups) and the uncertainties are mitigated (averaging within
a group). We extend this idea to the case where producers’
estimates are correlated. We note that this paper focuses on
the empirical behaviors of the renewable producers and the
corresponding consequences for the electricity market. For a
more in depth study of the Cournot game, interested readers
can refer to [20].
Coalitions of wind producers have been considered in the
past by many authors [9], [12], [16], [17], [22]. However the
main focus was on how to divide up the profit of a group
among its members, not on the effect of groups on the entire
system. Since most of previous studies assume that wind farms
are always price takers, the grand coalition is often the most
desirable set up. Recently, some authors have focused on the
strategic behavior of wind farms [23], [24], which is closer
to our setting. But these papers mainly consider the strategic
action of a single price-anticipatory wind farm, whereas we
focus on the joint behavior of many producers.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces
the model and problem setup. Section III studies the effect of
coalition under a fixed real-time penalty for both independent
and correlated producers. Section IV investigates the effect of
a real-time market on the risk faced by the producers. Finally,
Section V concludes the paper.
II. MODEL AND PROBLEM SETUP
We consider a system consisting of renewable producers,
traditional generators, and loads. Throughout, N represents
the number of renewable producers. We do not distinguish
between traditional generators. We assume the loads in the
system are inelastic, deterministic and known to all parties.
We will assume that there is no congestion and use a single
bus model for the network. The case of a network with
possible congestions is not considered in this paper and it is
an important direction of future research. We use the terms
group and coalition interchangeably in this paper.
We adopt a two-stage structure for the delivery of electricity
consisting of a day-ahead stage followed by a real-time stage.
The day-ahead stage is a pool-based market, where generators
submit their bids to a system operator. The operator clears the
auction and determines the generation schedule. The clearing
price is denoted by p ($/MW). If a generator cannot meet its
promised amount, a penalty is assessed for the shortfall at real-
time. In some markets, generators are assessed the real-time
cost (or profit) for the net deviation at the real-time profit. We
consider the fixed penalty case in Section III and real-time
market case in Section IV. It is well know that the real-time
prices are notoriously hard to predict and model [25], [26],
and a simple stochastic model is adopted in Section IV.
Since renewable producers have zero marginal cost (or near
zero cost), we restrict them to bid only the amount of energy
3they are willing to deliver into the day-ahead market3. Let
wi be the bid by producer and Wi be the random variable
representing the amount of renewable generation. Note Wi is
based on the day-ahead forecast information, so the random-
ness in Wi can be thought of as coming from the forecast
error. Under the constant real-time penalty, the total expected
payoff for producer i is denoted πi, given by
πi(wi) = p(w1, . . . , wN )wi − qE[(wi −Wi)
+]. (1)
where (·)+ is the positive part of a number. The first term
reflects that the bids from all producers affect the day-ahead
price p. The second term reflect the penalty term: if the
realized renewable power, Wi, is less than the amount bid,
wi, a penalty is paid based on the real-time price. Here, the
coefficient q can be thought as a given constant4. In Section
IV, we consider a real-time market in which the second term
can be both positive or negative.
A. Impact of Renewables on the Day-ahead Price
In this section we determine the impact of renewables on
day-ahead market clearing prices. Since the demand is inelastic
and we assume that the traditional generation mix is fixed,
the clearing price without any renewable injection can be
normalized to be 1 per unit. As renewable producers bid into
the market, the clearing price would drop below that. Also,
we normalize the demand to be 1 per unit since it is inelastic.
The demand curve is defined as a function relating the
clearing price of purchasing one unit of energy to the total
amount of energy being purchased. With the above normal-
izations, the residual demand curve is defined on the interval
[0, 1] and takes values on the interval [0, 1]. To construct
the demand curve for a particular day, the bid curves of all
generators would be stacked up to determine the cheapest
clearing price for a certain demand. Since we are interested
on the overall qualitative behavior of renewable producers, we
study the average demand curve constructed from historical
bid information. Fig. 2 shows the demand curve for PJM
in 2007. This year was chosen to capture the generator bids
before there was significant wind in the system.
The participation of renewable producers reduces the clear-
ing price on the demand curve. A key observation from Fig. 2
is that the right half of the demand curve is well approximated
by a linear function. We assume that the demand is at 1
p.u. before renewable resources are introduced in the system.
Therefore the clearing price decreases as a linear function of
amount of renewables in the system up to modest penetration
levels. Let
∑N
i=1 wi be the total amount of renewable power
that is bid into the day-ahead market. We parametrize the day-
ahead price as a function of the renewable bids as
p(w1, . . . , wN ) = p
(
N∑
i=1
wi
)
= 1− α
N∑
i=1
wi, (2)
3Traditional generators typically bid a curve representing the cost of
generation at different output levels.
4Equivalently, q can be thought as a random variable that is independent
to everything else, the we may replace q by E[q].
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Fig. 2. The demand curve for PJM 2007 bids. The red dot shows that about
87% of the total demand can be purchased at half of the clearing price. For
the data used, the clearing price was at $60. The red line shows the linear
approximation for the right part of the demand curve. This approximation
works well up to about 25% renewable penetration.
where α is a parameter that controls how fast the price
decreases. Note the parameter α in (2) is typically larger
than unity as a small amount of renewables could reduce the
day-ahead price significantly. For example, if there is 14%
penetration of wind in Fig. 2, then the clearing price would
be reduced to 50% of the original price, which gives α = 3.5.
Figure 2 is based on PJM data, but the shape of the curve,
especially the sharp rise at the right of the curve is common
among most electricity markets [27].
If the total bid
∑N
i=1 wi is larger than
1
α , then the approx-
imation in (2) breaks down. One possible way to resolve this
issue is to threshold p to 0 when the total bid amount exceeds
1
α . However, since it is never in the interest of the producers
to have a total bid of more than 1α , negative prices would
never arise in the day-ahead market. A more fundamental
issue is that at higher levels of penetration, the nonlinearity in
the curve in Fig 2 becomes important to the behavior of the
renewable generators in the day-ahead market. Therefore, our
results hold under low to moderate penetration of renewables,
and the nonlinearity needs to be accounted to extend the results
to higher penetrations.
Remark: A relevant question is whether conventional gen-
erator will change their bids in the presence of renewables.
From PJM reports[28], it seems that conventional generators
already bid their true cost, and therefore would not change
their bid (bidding lower make no economic sense and bidding
higher decrease the chance that they are cleared).
III. COALITION OF RENEWABLE PRODUCERS WITH FIXED
PENALTY
Suppose that the renewable producers are divided into K
groups and let S1, . . . ,SK denote the groups. Two extreme
examples serve as benchmarks throughout the paper: the grand
coalition, where all producers are in one group; and individual
competition, where the producers compete as single players.
4For a group Sk, its profit is defined as
πSk = p(w1, . . . , wN )
∑
i∈Sk
wi − q E


(∑
i∈Sk
wi −
∑
i∈Sk
Wi
)+
(3a)
(a)
= (1− α
N∑
l=1
wl)
∑
i∈Sk
wi − q E

(∑
i∈Sk
wi −
∑
i∈Sk
Wi
)+ ,
(3b)
where (a) follows from the linear price model in (2). Com-
paring (1) and (3), we see that essentially the bid wi of a
single producer is replaced by the bid
∑
i∈Sk
wi of a group
of producers. Since the penalty term in the expectation is
not linear, the profit of a group is not simply the sum of its
individual parts and this leads to the benefit of aggregation. To
study the effect of aggregation in depth, we adopt the following
stochastic model.
A. Stochastic Model
Let W be a positive random variable with mean µ. This
random variable can be interpreted as already incorporating the
forecasting information, and µ can be thought as the day-ahead
forecast. Therefore, the distribution of W is the conditional
distribution of the forecast error conditioned on the day-ahead
forecast. If there are N producers, let W1, . . . ,WN be drawn
identically from the distribution of W and the output of the
i’th producer is Wi/N and the total output of N producers is
1
N
N∑
i=1
Wi.
This stochastic model allows us to keep the mean of the total
amount of renewable power in the system constant and focus
on the effect of a large number of producers. The next two
sections study the cases when the producers are independent
and when they are correlated. We do not specify a particular
distribution for Wi since the results hold for a wide case
of distributions. Note that since we assume that the random
variables are identically distributed, they should be produced
by the same type of source. For a mixture of renewable
sources, e.g. wind and solar, the identical assumption may
not hold. Algorithm 1 in the Appendix partially addresses the
mixed case by outlining a procedure for selecting groups based
only on their covariance matrices.
Since each coalition can only offer a bid in quantity, the
profit model in (3) sets up a Cournot competition among
the different groups [29]. In [20], we consider in depth the
game theoretic questions such as the existence and properties
of Nash equilibria. In particular, we show that under broad
conditions, it is always in the benefit of producers to form
groups. In the current paper, we are less concerned with such
questions, and simply note that the ISO can impose rules on
the size of coalitions and we are interested in determining the
optimal size of the groups.
The following definition states when we consider a set of
groups to be optimal.
Definition 1. Given a set of groups S1, . . . ,SK that form a
partition of {1, . . . , N}, let {w1, . . . , wK} be the set of bids
at a Nash equilibrium under (3). We say the set of groups is
optimal if ∑Kk=1 wk = 1α .
Under the price model, 1/α is the maximum amount (mea-
sured as a fraction of the total demand) of renewables that can
be injected into the system. At this bid value, the day-ahead
price becomes
1− α
∑
i
wi = 1− α
1
α
= 0.
Any additional injection would cause the price to go negative,
which means that our price model in (2) breaks down.
B. Independent Forecast Errors
In this subsection, we will focus on the situation where the
forecast errors of the renewable producers are independent.
Of course, the forecast errors are correlated in the practice.
However, understanding the independent case helps to illus-
trate the core concepts associated with grouping of producers.
The main result is that neither individual competition nor
the grand coalition are efficient, but there exists coalitions
of intermediate size that are efficient. The correlated forecast
error case is considered in the next subsection using NREL
data.
We consider coalitions of three types: the grand coalition,
individual competition and groups of intermediate size. Of
these three, we demonstrate that the groups of intermediate
size is optimal from the system point of view since they
balance the trade-off between market power and uncertainty.
Figure 3 plots the total day-ahead bid versus the number of
groups for four increasing values of N . The leftmost point
in the figures represent the grand coalition (a single group)
and the rightmost point represent individual competition (N
groups). As shown in Fig. 3, the maximum total bid occurs
at group sizes in between the two extremes. As N grows, the
maximum approaches the 1/α limit.
The parameters used in generating Fig. 3 are α = 3.4, q = 1
and E[Wi] = µ = 0.3. The value of µ specifies that the
total expected renewable in the system is 30%. The Wi’s are
assumed to be Gaussian (Gaussian forecast errors). The exact
value of µ, α, q and the particular distribution of Wi’s do
not change the qualitative behavior of the results. Below we
explain why the intermediate case is optimal while the two
extremes are suboptimal.
First we consider the case of the grand coalition. The profit
of the coalition is given by
π(w) = (1− αw)w − qE

(w − N∑
i=1
Wi/N
)+ , (4)
where w is the bid of the grand coalition. The bid w∗ that
maximize the profit solves
1− 2αw∗ − q Pr
(
w∗ −
N∑
i=1
Wi/N
)
= 0,
51 2 5 10 23 500.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
Number of Groups
To
ta
l D
ay
−a
he
ad
 B
id
1/α
(a) N=50
1  3  6  16 40 1000.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
Number of Groups
To
ta
l D
ay
−a
he
ad
 B
id
1/α
(b) N=100
1  3  12 42 144 500
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
Number of Groups
To
ta
l D
ay
−a
he
ad
 B
id
1/α
(c) N=500
1   4   16  63  251 10000.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
Number of Groups
To
ta
l D
ay
−a
he
ad
 B
id
1/α
(d) N=1000
Fig. 3. The total day-ahead bid versus the number of groups (in log-scale)
for four different values of N . The leftmost point of the each plot is the
grand coalition and the rightmost point is individual competition. We see
that the grand coalition induces the least amount of biding in the system
under the simulation parameters of α = 0.3 and q = 1. The maximum
amount of day-ahead bid always occurs at intermediate number of groups.
As N increase from 50 to 1000, the maximum total bid approaches 1/α, the
efficient outcome.
where Pr() is with respect to the joint probability of the Wi’s.
We are interested in w∗ as N increases. As N grows, by the
law of large numbers,
∑N
i=1Wi/N approaches its mean in
probability. In this regime, there is essentially no uncertainty
for the grand coalition and market power dominates. Figure 3
shows that as expected, the amount of renewable injected into
the system is limited by this market power.
Next, we consider the case where the individual producers
do not form groups. The profit for producer i is (special case
of (3))
πi(wi) =
(
1− α
N∑
l=1
wl
)
wi − q E[(wi −Wi/N)
+]. (5)
Given the bid of other producers, the bid that maximizes the
profit of producer i is the solution to
1− 2αw∗i − α
N∑
l 6=i
wl − q Pr(Wi/N ≤ w
∗
i ) = 0. (6)
Due to symmetry among the players, all producers would
submit the same bid at equilibrium5. Therefore the optimal
bid w∗i solves
1− (N + 1)αw∗i − q Pr(Wi/N ≤ w
∗
i ) = 0.
As N increases, each producer becomes smaller in size so
they act as price takers. However, the second stage penalty
dominates, so the total amount of renewable injection is still
limited as shown in Fig. 3.
Groups of intermediate size balance the trade-off between
market power and uncertainty. As N grows, the total number
of groups also grows, ensuring competitiveness. On the other
hand, the number of producers in a group also increases,
ensuring averaging to reduce uncertainty. As Fig. 3 shows,
this intermediate grouping maximizes the amount of renewable
injected into the system.
Remark: Optimal Group Size? It turns out that most
groups are asymptotically efficient, in the sense as long as
the number of groups (K) and the number of producers in
a group (N/K) both grows as N grows. However, although
the number of producers in practice is large, it is not infinite6.
Therefore an interesting question is to find the optimal scaling
rate, or the group size that approaches 1/α the fastest. As we
show in [20], the optimal scaling rate is obtained by N2/3
groups of size N1/3. This result is obtained by separating
the effect of market power and uncertainty in analyzing the
efficiency of the Cournot game.
Remark: Producer Revenue An interesting question about
coalition formation is how individual producer’s revenue
change as the group size grows. For simplicity, consider the
case with no uncertainty, that is, there is no second stage
penalty. Let there be N producers and they are divided into K
groups. It is straightforward to calculate that the per producer
profit is given by
1
αN
K
(K + 1)2
.
The 1/(αN) factor is a common term independent of K .
Therefore as K (the number of groups) increases, the per
producer profit decreases roughly as 1/K . On one hand, this
5Since the producers are symmetric, it is easy to show that if not all bids
are the same, then some producers would change their bids, so the Nash
equilibrium of this game is symmetric and unique.
6Large control regions such as CAISO or ERCOT could have thousands of
renewable producers.
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Fig. 4. Forecasted wind power and its associated forecast error.
is not surprising, since at an efficient Nash equilibrium, the
marginal profit of a producer equal to its marginal production
cost. Since wind power producers have zero marginal cost,
each producer have zero profit at the efficient equilibrium.
From the producers’ point of view, they have a great
amount incentive to form the largest possible coalition. Under
current regulations, producers are not allowed to form any
kind of groups. Then if operators allowed coalition formations,
but limited the maximum size of the group to be the size
that induces the most renewable penetration, the producers
would naturally form the desired groups. However, instead of
regulations, we should seek a market mechanism for to limit
the size of groups. This question is not considered in this paper
but is an interesting direction for further studies.
C. Correlated Forecast Errors
In this section, we show that the coalitions of intermediate
size are still optimal when the forecast errors are correlated. A
general theory for correlated producers is difficult to develop in
part due to the fact that results would depend on the particular
distribution of the errors. In this section, we focus on empirical
data from NREL eastern wind studies [30]. This dataset is a
simulated study of the amount of wind power available at
different geographical locations in the eastern part of U.S.
Simulation was performed based on a meteorological and geo-
graphical conditions, validated using some field measurements.
We consider the 302 locations that are in the PJM control area.
Figure 4 shows the forecasted wind power at a particular wind
site and its associated forecast error.
Figure 5 shows the standard deviation of the aggregate
forecast (1/N∑Ni=1Wi) as a function of the number of wind
farms in the aggregate. If the forecast errors are independent,
we would expect that the standard deviation to decrease as
the number of producers grows. Instead, Fig. 5 shows that the
standard deviation flattens out as N increases.
Similar to the previous section, we still look for a group
structure that maximizes the total amount of wind power bid
into the system. Note that the profit function for a group of
producers is still given by (3). The main differences between
the independent and correlated cases are: 1) the 1/α result is
not achievable since error does not approach zero as N grows;
and 2) groups size do need to not tend to infinity since all the
benefit of averaging is achieved at finite group sizes.
For simplicity, we always normalize the wind farms to have
equal capacity. However, since the standard deviations and the
cross correlation between different producers are not equal,
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Fig. 5. Standard deviation as a function of the number of producers in
an aggregation. The vertical axis is normalized by the total capacity of the
aggregation.
Fig. 6. Total amount of wind bid into the day-ahead market as a function of
the number of groups for the wind farms in the NREL dataset. The maximum
occurs at 30 groups, while the minimum occurs at a single group (grand
coalition). Compare to Fig. 3, the maximum is lower in the current case due
to correlated errors.
the optimal groups may not be of the same size. In fact,
to find the best group structure is a combinatorial problem
that requires the knowledge of the detailed joint distribution
of all forecast errors. Rather than focus on finding the best
possible way to group the wind farms, we are more interested
in the qualitative statement that some intermediate grouping is
optimal for maximizing wind power injection. Therefore we
present a simple greedy algorithm for selecting the groups.
This algorithm takes the number of groups as an input, and
outputs a partition of the wind farms into the desired number
of groups based only on the covariance matrix. It is given in
the Appendix.
Figure 6 plots the number of groups versus the total day-
ahead bid of the groups. All the parameters are the same
with respect to the simulations shown in Fig. 3, in particular,
α = 3.4. We see that in the correlated case, the maximum
amount of wind power bid in day-ahead is about 24.3% of the
total demand, occurring when the producers are divided into
30 groups. Note that the total bid is less than the maximum
amount in the i.i.d. (identically and independently distributed)
case in the previous section, which is 1/α = 29%. This shows
7that not all the uncertainty can be averaged out of the system.
Each of the groups contains roughly the same number of wind
farms, ranging from 8 to 12 farms. The aggregate capacity of
each group is also approximately the same. The approximate
symmetry of the groups are expected since the capacity of
each of the wind farms are normalized to be the same, and
the original wind farms in the NREL dataset are similar to
each other both in distribution and in capacity. The case of
renewable producers that differ drastically in size is a direction
of future research.
Remark: Market Power in Real-Time. In Fig. 6, the
group selection is optimized by grouping producers with
uncorrelated or anti-correlated errors to achieve uncertainty
reduction. Because producers only exercise market power in
the day-ahead stage, for groups of similar mean output, smaller
uncertainty is preferred by both the system and the producers.
However, if groups can exercise significant market power in
real-time, positively correlated producers may group together
to take advantage of large swings in their output. Exploring the
tension created by real-time market power maybe a worthwhile
question to answer.
IV. RISK AND REAL-TIME PRICES
In the model we have adopted so far, the real-time deviation
is penalized when the bid quantity is less than the actual
realized wind (recall (5) and (3)). In this section we show that
the conclusion from previous sections is still valid under more
complicated real-time mechanisms. In particular, we show that
as long as the producers are risk averse, there is a benefit to
forming groups of intermediate sizes. More broadly, as long as
the objective functions for the producers are convex in wi−Wi,
a similar result can be derived as in Figs. 3 and 6. Therefore
the penalty adopted in (5) and (3) can be seen as a special
case of a convex objective function.
In practice, different market operators adopt different rules
for handling real-time deviations. In some markets, both posi-
tive and negative deviations of generator output are penalized
(e.g. Spain), although this double sided penalty is not applica-
ble to renewable producers since their production can be easily
curtailed. A more relevant real-time mechanism to consider is
the real-time market. In many of the US electricity markets
and some European markets (e.g. Nord Pool), a market is
run at (or near to) real-time to readjust and balance supply
and demand [2]. A generator is then charged a penalty for its
shortfall and charged or paid at the real-time market clearing
price depending on the sign of its deviation. Consider a group
of renewable producers in S. The profit of the group would
be
πS =
(
1− α
N∑
l=1
wl
)∑
i∈S
wi − E
[
prt ·
(∑
i∈S
wi −
∑
i∈S
Wi
)]
− qE


(∑
i∈S
wi −
∑
i∈S
Wi
)+
.
(7)
The second term in (7) represents the result of the settlement
of the real-time market. If prt is positive, and
∑
i∈S wi −
∑
i∈S Wi is negative (excess power), the group receives pay-
ment by selling back its excess power.
The modeling of the real-time price is notoriously difficult,
in part due to its complex dependence on many possible
aspects of the system (e.g. generator outages, unscheduled
intertie flows, topology changes and others). For this section,
we adopt the following model for the real-time price
prt = p · 1
(
ǫ+
N∑
i
(wi −Wi)
)
=
{
p if ǫ+
∑N
i (wi −Wi) > 0
0 otherwise
.
(8)
In (8), the real-time price can take on two values, p and 0.
We think of p as the price cap of the system. The random
variable ǫ is independent to the Wi’s and can be thought as
an idiosyncratic shock in the demand. Together, the term ǫ+∑N
i (wi−Wi) is interpreted as the net demand in the system at
real-time. The real-time price hits the cap if the net demand is
positive, and is zero otherwise. Of course, the model in (8) is
crude, but it does capture the volatility of the real-time prices
[27].
To focus on the effect of real-time price on the profit of
each group, we replace the penalty term in (7) and consider a
profit function of the form
πS =
(
1− α
N∑
l=1
wl
)∑
i∈S
wi−E
[
prt ·
(∑
i∈S
wi −
∑
i∈S
Wi
)]
.
(9)
As in Section III-B, we focus on the case of i.i.d. Wi’s.
Suppose there are K equally sized groups S1, . . . ,SK . The
Nash equilibrium of bids is given by simultaneously finding
optimal solution to (9) for each of the groups. Let wk be the
equilibrium bid of Sk, and it is the solution of
1− α(K + 1)wk − pPr
(
K∑
k=1
−ǫ <
K∑
k=1
wk
)
. (10)
Due to symmetry, the bids of all groups are equal.
Figure 7 shows the total day-ahead bid as a function of the
number of groups for 1000 producers. We see that the grand
coalition still bids the least amount of renewable power into
the system and the total bid increases as the number of groups
increases. In contrast to Fig. 3, the maximum bid is achieved
by individual competition. Also, due to the presence of the
exogenous random variable ǫ, it is not possible to achieve an
aggregate bid of 1/α.
From Fig. 7 it seems that grouping is not necessary since
individual competition already induces maximum bidding
among the producers. Indeed, this is not unexpected since the
probability in (10) depends only on the sum of all Wi’s and
the exogenous random variable ǫ. Therefore grouping does
not affect the uncertainty part of the profit, and individual
competition is optimal to maximize competition among the
producers. Therefore, the mean profit of a group is only
affected by its market power, but not by the uncertainty of
producers in that group.
Even though the average profit does not depend on uncer-
tainty within a group, forming groups can still be beneficial
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Fig. 7. The aggregate bid by the renewable producers as a function of the
number of groups (log-scale) for 1000 producers. The grand coalition injects
the least amount of renewable into the system and the bid increases as the
number of groups increases. Note that it is not possible to approach 1/α
because of the exogenous randomness in ǫ.
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Fig. 8. Sample paths of per producer profit for individual competition and
groups of size 10. The total number of producer is 100. Two sample paths
have the same mean, but the first is much more volatile than the second.
to producers. As in Section III-B, we focus on the case of
i.i.d. Wi’s. Consider 100 producers (N = 100). Assume ǫ
is Gaussian with zero mean and standard deviation of 0.05
(5% uncertainty). Figure 8 shows the sample paths of the per
producer profit for individual competition and group of size
10. Both sample paths have the same mean value, meaning that
the expected profit for each group is the same, but Fig.s 8(a) is
much more volatile than Fig. 8(b). From a producer’s revenue
management perspective, the revenue stream in Fig. 8(b) is
preferable. Therefore grouping of producers is still beneficial
to the market, as long as the groups are not large enough to
have significant market power.
A form of risk not captured by the above model is the inex-
act knowledge of the probability distribution of ǫi. Developing
robust bidding solutions is an important direction for future
work.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we investigated group formations and strategic
behaviors of renewable power producers in electricity markets.
To maximize the amount of renewable power injected into
the system, we characterized the trade-off between market
power and generation uncertainty as a function of the size
of groups. We show there is a sweet spot in the sense
that there exists groups that are large enough to achieve the
uncertainty reduction of the grand coalition, but small enough
such that they have no significant market power. We derived
a linear model to quantify the effect of renewable bids on
the day-ahead market clearing price. By modeling the day-
ahead bidding process as a Cournot game, we showed that
grouping producers into coalitions of intermediate size achieve
the social optimal outcome. We considered both independent
and correlated forecast errors under a fixed real-time penalty,
and independent errors under a real-time market where both
selling and buying of energy is allowed. We validated our
claims using PJM and NREL data.
APPENDIX
GREEDY ALGORITHM FOR GROUP SELECTION
Given N random variables W1, . . . ,WN and a positive
integer K < N , we wish to partition the random variables
into K sets, S1, . . . ,SK that solves the following optimization
problem
max
S1,...,SK
K∑
k=1
wk (11a)
s.t. 1− 2αwk − α
∑
l 6=k
wl − q Pr(
∑
i∈Sk
Wi ≤ wk) = 0 ∀ k
(11b)
, where (11a) is the total day-ahead bid and (11b) is the
condition for the Nash equilibrium among the K groups.
The optimization in (11) is a difficult problem for two
reasons: it is combinatorial, and solving it requires the joint
distribution of the random variables. To deal with the latter,
we use the variance of the aggregate
∑
i∈Sk
Wi as a proxy
for the uncertainty in k’th group; for the former, we adopt a
greedy algorithm to construct the groups.
The greedy algorithm is presented below. It proceeds in two
parts. In the first part, it selects K producers as seeds for the K
groups. In the second part, it progressively adds producers to
the existing groups according to the covariance between them.
In this paper, we compute empirical covariance between two
wind farm’s power output using their historical information,
and use that in the algorithm.
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